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The Impact of Bail Reform in Memphis: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Standing Bail Order in Shelby County, Tennessee --Manuscript Draft--

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Abstract:	<p>Objectives: Assess the impact of the 2022 Standing Bail Order (SBO) in Shelby County, Tennessee. This reform effort was designed to promote fairer pretrial practices by reducing financial-based detention and ensuring timely judicial review and legal counsel.</p> <p>Methods: A regression discontinuity design used the SBO implementation as a natural experiment. The analysis covered 7,772 cases using court and jail data, modeling eleven dependent variables related to bail setting, detention, legal representation, and public safety.</p> <p>Results: The SBO significantly increased release-on recognizance (35%) and reduced bond amounts (11%) within seven days. Timely legal counsel rose 138%, and seven-day release rates increased by 69%. Overall bond amounts fell, while the time to set bail slightly increased. There were no significant effects on court appearance or public safety outcomes.</p> <p>Conclusions: The SBO improved pretrial fairness without observable impacts on court appearance or public safety.</p>	

Original Research

The Impact of Bail Reform in Memphis: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Standing Bail Order in Shelby County, Tennessee

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KEYWORDS

bail affordability, bail reform, pretrial detention, policy evaluation, regression discontinuity, standing bail order

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

JB was responsible for the study conception, designing the analytic strategy, performing data management, estimating and interpreting the statistical models, and drafting the methods and results. DK was responsible for the literature review, assisting with the discussion, and editing the final draft. TM was responsible for revising the methods and results, assisting with the discussion, editing the final draft, and preparing the manuscript for submission. All authors read and approved of the final manuscript.

INTRODUCTION

Bail reform has become a key fixture of the criminal justice reform movement over the past two decades. Amidst concerns across the United States of pretrial defendants remaining detained solely due to their financial inability to post bail, jurisdictions across the country have implemented various policy changes in the areas of pretrial release, bail, and detention (Wylie & Grawert, 2024). In response to these concerns, several jurisdictions have adopted bail reform measures that address procedural due process, risk assessment, offense categories, and community services.

One such jurisdiction is Shelby County, Tennessee, which includes the city limits of Memphis. In 2021, the pretrial processes of Shelby County faced scrutiny, according to a demand letter co-signed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for “needlessly” detaining hundreds of people solely due to their financial status (Wharton et al., 2021). To address these concerns and stymie potential litigation, Shelby County implemented several reforms to its pretrial processes, codified in an August 2022 Standing Bail Order (SBO) by the county’s General Sessions Criminal Court. The reforms, which took effect in February 2023, mandated an evaluation and consideration of the affordability of bond, as well as implemented bail review hearings with counsel for defendants unable to quickly bond out of jail following initial bond setting.

In this paper, we take advantage of the timing of the SBO’s implementation as a “natural experiment”, assessing the causal impacts of the SBO using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Beginning on the morning of February 15, 2023, all defendants who were arrested became subject to the new conditions of SBO. Using this cutoff, we examine whether the reform influenced eleven measures of pretrial outcomes. Through this analysis, the study seeks to

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4 provide a clearer understanding of bail reform and to evaluate the current bail system and its
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6 intended effects on the community.
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9 **LITERATURE REVIEW**

10 **History of Bail Reform**

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14 Bail reform has become one of the most discussed issues in today's criminal justice
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16 system. Traditionally, after an arrest, a judicial officer sets a cash bail amount to ensure that the
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18 accused individual will appear for future court proceedings while allowing them to stay in the
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20 community in the meantime (ACLU, n.d.; Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Policy Program,
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22 2016). In general, this process leaves the individual with three options (ACLU, n.d.). First, the
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24 person may pay the full bail amount (either in cash or via a commercial bail/bond company),
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26 which allows them to be released while their case moves through the system (Harvard Law
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28 School Criminal Justice Policy Program, 2016). Second, if the bail amount cannot be paid
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30 (mostly because it is not affordable for the accused individual), the person gets detained in jail
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32 until the case is resolved, with detention serving as a form of assurance that they will appear in
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34 court. Finally, in some cases an individual may more readily give up their right for a trial and
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36 negotiate a plea agreement.
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43 However, more recently, this traditional bail system has been under increasing scrutiny
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45 for several reasons. It is estimated that approximately 630,000 people are held in local jails on
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47 any given day, and about 60% of them are detained not because they have been convicted, but
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49 primarily because they cannot afford to pay their bail (ACLU, n.d.; Garrett, 2022; Sawyer &
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51 Wagner, 2020; Vera Institute of Justice, 2019). For this phenomenon, ACLU (n.d.) argues that the
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53 cash bail system is the single biggest drivers of mass incarceration in the United States by
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55 perpetuating wealth-based incarceration.
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4 With this, researchers have raised several concerns on the effectiveness of traditional bail
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6 system and its impact on public safety and defendant's future appearance. First, there is little
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8 empirical evidence to justify a direct link between paying bail and ensuring a defendant's court
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10 appearance (Monaghan et al., 2022; Ouss & Stevenson, 2023). Second, the traditional bail
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12 system may function as an additional form of punishment for those who cannot afford to pay the
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14 bail amount (Jones, 2013; Arnold et al., 2018; Bronson & Berzofsky, 2017). Third, individuals
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16 who cannot afford to post bail are also more likely to face harsher outcomes, such as receiving
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18 longer and harsher sentences (Heaton et al., 2017). Lastly, even in cases where an arrest was
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20 made in error and no charges are ultimately filed, individuals are generally not reimbursed for
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22 the bail if made through a bail bondsman (ACLU, n.d.).
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28 However, the criminal justice system's efforts to address these concerns have not always
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30 been successful. For example, the federal government enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
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32 which allowed preventative detention without the option of bond if there is clear and convincing
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34 evidence that an individual poses a danger to the community or a significant flight risk (Bail
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36 Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984; Garrett, 2022; Overbeck, 1986). The
37
38 introduction of preventive detention in 1984 has since raised concerns regarding potential
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40 violations of individual freedom and the risk of imposing punishment prior to being proven to be
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42 guilty. Civil rights organizations, such as the ACLU (n.d.), and some legal scholars argue that the
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44 current bail system may violate constitutional protections, including the Fourteenth
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46 Amendment's guarantee of due process and equal protection, the Eighth Amendment's
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48 prohibition against excessive bail, and the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial (Overbeck,
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50 1986).
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58 **Types of Bail Reform**

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4 In response to these criticisms and a growing demand in some jurisdictions to move away
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6 from the traditional bail system, local, state, and federal governments have put various efforts
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8 and legislation aimed at reforming bail system, including the abolition or reduced use of cash
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10 bail (Garrett, 2022). Although these reforms share overlapping characteristics, Garrett (2022)
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12 identifies six distinct models of bail reform approaches based on their primary focus: the
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14 procedural due process model, the risk assessment model, the categorical model, the community
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16 services model, the equal protection model, and the alternatives to arrest model. In this paper, we
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18 focus on the first four models, as the last two have not yet been widely adopted or put in place.
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23 The procedural due process model emphasizes bail hearings conducted by a judicial
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25 officer, focusing on decisions about whether to impose pretrial conditions and, if so, what type
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27 (Carroll, 2020; Garrett, 2022). Within this model, defendants are presumed to be eligible for
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29 release, and the state bears the burden of providing proof that releasing the individual would pose
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31 a threat to public safety or create a flight risk (Garrett, 2022). The main focus is procedural
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33 fairness in pretrial decision making, particularly on whether the defendant has the ability to pay a
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35 cash bail amount and whether they can comply with the conditions of release. A notable
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37 improvement under this model is the expectation that defendants are represented by counsel
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39 during bail hearings, as it was not traditionally provided. Research has shown that the presence
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41 of legal counsel during bail hearings improves pretrial outcomes by strengthening fairness,
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43 legitimacy, and the protection of defendants' rights (Heaton, 2021; Colbert et al., 2001; Colbert,
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45 2020). Despite these benefits, critics argue that the model still leaves considerable discretion to
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47 judicial officers, allowing room for disparity and bias (Garrett, 2022). Concerns also include the
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49 potential for harsher treatment of low-income defendants, delays in the process due to a more
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51 rigorous hearing, and ambiguity regarding what constitutes "evidence" to justify detention on the
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4 basis of flight risk or public safety (Garrett, 2022). Nevertheless, several jurisdictions, including
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6 Illinois (725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-6.1, 2023), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-409,
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8 2020), California (In re Kenneth Humphrey, 2021), and Arizona (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.3(c)(2)(A),
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10 2023), have adopted elements of this model. These reforms generally include guaranteeing a
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12 right to counsel, requiring the state to justify detention, or mandating consideration of the
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14 defendant's ability to pay (Garrett, 2022; Lester, 2005).
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19 One of the prominent examples of procedural due process model is Georgia. In 2018,
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21 Georgia enacted Senate Bill 407, which clarified that “all but the most serious charges are
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23 subjected to bail by the court's request,” and required judges to evaluate the defendant's
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25 financial affordability to pay when making bail decisions, in all cases, as soon as possible
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27 (O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1), (g), 2018; Woods et al., 2019). Following this reform, Woods et al.
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29 (2019) examined whether these changes led to significant improvements in four areas: 1)
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31 consideration of affordability in bail decisions, 2) whether bail hearings were held within 48
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33 hours of arrest, 3) whether defendants were released within 48 hours of arrest, and 4) whether
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35 public defenders were provided at initial bail hearings. Analyzing 51 of Georgia's 159 counties,
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37 the study found that none of the criteria were met by more than 50% of counties. Due to this
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39 result, the authors concluded that “Georgia courts are not adhering closely to either state or
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41 federal law” (p. 1255). Furthermore, there was considerable variation across counties in how
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43 closely they followed the reform measures as well.
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51 In contrast to the procedural due process model, the risk assessment model uses
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53 empirically validated scores from a risk assessment to predict an individual's likelihood of
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55 appearing for court hearings and their potential for recidivism, and judges use these scores to
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57 guide decisions about pretrial release or detention (Garrett, 2022; Garrett & Monahan, 2020).
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4 This approach is designed to limit judicial discretion, which can leave room for unnecessary
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6 disparity or discrimination, by relying on structured, data-driven assessments (Garrett, 2022).
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8 Despite some criticisms regarding the accuracy of the assessment and concerns about potential
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10 racial and ethnic bias that are already instilled in the assessment (Garrett, 2022; Mayson, 2018;
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12 The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2018), several jurisdictions, including
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14 New Jersey (New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act, 2014) and Kentucky (Kentucky General
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16 Assembly, 2011), have implemented bail reforms that align closely with this model.
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21 The categorical model determines pretrial detention or release based on pre-designed
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23 offense-based categories (mainly depending on arrest charges), hence, eliminating the need for a
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25 bail hearing in these cases (Garrett, 2022). Building on the preventive detention provisions of the
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27 Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, this model expands the categories for both preventive
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29 detention and release, while incorporating procedural due process through hearings where
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31 required (Garrett, 2022). For example, this approach allows preventive detention for certain
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33 serious offenses (e.g., first-degree murder) and presumes release or unsecured bond for
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35 misdemeanors or lower-level offenses (Garrett, 2022; National Conference of State Legislatures,
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37 2020). This approach is used in the federal system (United States v. Watkins, 2019) and in 22
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39 states, including Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-64a(a)(2), 2017), Illinois (725 ILCS
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41 5/110-6.1(a)(1)–(6), 2023), New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-16(a)–(b), 2017), New Mexico
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43 (N.M. Const. art. II, § 13, 2016), Texas (Tex. S.B. 6 § 5(b 2)(1), 2021), and the District of
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45 Columbia. With straightforwardness as its strongest advantage, this approach raises concerns
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47 about overbreadth, as it risks unnecessarily detaining individuals who fall within a broad offense
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49 category without individualized assessment (Garrett, 2022).
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4 Lastly, the community services model emphasizes releasing individuals rather than
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7 detaining them, while utilizing community-based resources to support defendants during the
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9 pretrial process. These resources, such as social services, mental health care, and substance abuse
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11 treatment, are intended to increase the individual's court appearance rates, improve pretrial
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13 outcomes, and reduce the likelihood of recidivism (Garrett, 2022; Gong, 2019). This model was
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15 first implemented in the District of Columbia, where comprehensive mental health treatment and
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17 service programs were available for the pretrial process (Pretrial Services Agency for the District
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19 of Columbia, n.d.). Similar approaches have been adopted in other jurisdictions, including Harris
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21 County in Texas, Santa Clara County in California, and the state of Illinois, where a range of
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23 community services are offered to support defendants and enhance compliance with court
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25 requirements (Garrett, 2022).
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30 31 **About the Standing Bail Order** 32

33 The focus of this study is a set of reforms in Shelby County, Tennessee, implemented
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35 through a Standing Bail Order (SBO) issued by the General Sessions Court on August 15, 2022.
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37 The reform largely follows the characteristics of a procedural due process bail reform: the SBO
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39 implemented procedural changes to ensure that a bail hearing is conducted after an arrest with
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41 the presumption of release as the default, that there exists justification for pretrial conditions
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43 beyond unconditional release, that the defendant's ability to afford the bail amount be taken into
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45 account, and that legal counsel is present for defendants.
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50 Prior to the reform, when a defendant is arrested and booked into one of Shelby County's
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52 two county jails, he or she almost always had the right to post a bond. If the bond was posted, the
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54 defendant could be released while awaiting trial, typically under certain conditions such as GPS
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56 monitoring or bond payment.¹ Bond levels were set by judicial commissioners – these judicial
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4 officials are appointed by the Shelby County Commission and supervised by a Lead Judicial
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6 Commissioner, under the oversight of an elected judge of General Sessions Criminal Court.
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9 While the SBO does not fundamentally change the utilization of judicial commissioners
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11 to set initial bond amounts, the SBO aimed to improve the fairness of bond setting and ensure
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13 that defendants are not detained solely due to their financial status. Following the reform, when a
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15 defendant was booked into jail, judicial commissioners were required to use a structured set of
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17 criteria to determine bail conditions, informed by assessments from Shelby County Pretrial
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19 Services, when making release decisions. Release on recognizance (i.e., no money bond) was the
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21 default; judicial commissioners needed to provide formal justification for additional bond
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23 requirements such as release on non-monetary conditions or the requirement of a money bond.
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25 This process was intended to ensure that pretrial detention decisions remain proportionate and
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27 necessary, consistent with state law.² Figure 1 depicts a flowchart of the SBO in Shelby County.
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33 [insert Figure 1 about here]
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36 As part of the reform process, the Vera Institute's Ability to Pay calculator was used in
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38 pretrial screening to estimate an affordable bail amount for each defendant. When judicial
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40 commissioners determined that a financial bond was necessary to secure a defendant's court
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42 appearance, they were required either to set an affordable amount or to provide a written
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44 justification for setting an unaffordable bond.³
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48 If a defendant remained in custody due to an inability to post bond, a bail hearing was
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50 scheduled within 72 hours.^{4,5} Both the defendant and the State were required to be represented by
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52 counsel, and these hearings involved a *de novo* review of the judicial commissioner's decision.
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54 The hearings were conducted by a General Sessions judge or, at the judge's discretion, by a
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56 judicial commissioner in a newly designated bail review courtroom.
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CURRENT STUDY

The current study aims to provide a clearer understanding and assessment of Shelby County's new bail reform effort, Standing Bail Order, on whether the new procedural changes provided its intended effects on the community or impacted public safety. For this, we use a regression discontinuity framework, which is a quasi-experimental method that estimates causal effects by comparing units before and after a cutoff point, which would be assumed to be comparable outside of the treatment. This technique is often used when randomization is not ethical or practical since it allows us to approximate the conditions of a randomized controlled trial. In this study, we take the SBO's implementation as a cutoff point for assessing the causal impact on multiple pretrial outcomes.

DATA AND METHODS

Sample

To evaluate the impact of the SBO, we examine data files provided to the first author by Shelby County Government in January 2025. The data consist of a series of raw data extracts from Shelby County's court management system, as well as jail booking data made available by the Shelby County Sheriff's Office. The data are inclusive to all non-expunged, bail-relevant General Sessions cases filed between 2018 and 2024, as well as associated cases in the felony Criminal Court as applicable when the original case is bound over to the grand jury, as well as following grand jury indictment. The various data extracts were transformed by the first author into an analytical dataset to evaluate the impacts of the SBO.

We leverage the timing of the implementation of Shelby County's bail reforms to analyze the impact of the SBO as a natural experiment. With one exception,⁶ all provisions of the SBO took effect at a single point in time. All defendants arrested in Shelby County on or after the

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4 morning of February 15, 2023 were subject to the new conditions of the SBO, with simultaneous
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6 introduction of new bail screening forms and processes for judicial commissioners, as well as
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8 initiation of bail review hearings which opened two days later.
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11 The key assumption we make is that, for defendants arrested close in time to the February
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13 15, 2023 implementation date of the SBO, there are not significant differences in either the
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15 defendants or the judicial treatment of defendants other than the SBO. As a result, we use a
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17 regression discontinuity (RD) framework to evaluate the SBO's effects. Our forcing variable, or
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19 running variable, is time, in days, centered around the date and time of SBO implementation.⁷
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21 All cases with a forcing variable value greater than zero are subject to SBO procedures,
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23 including judicial commissioner utilization of new bail screening forms to consider affordability
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25 to pay, as well as automatic docketing of bail review hearings for defendants held in custody.
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31 **Dependent Variables**

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33 We consider eleven dependent variables across the forcing variable of time to assess the
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35 SBO's impact on bond-setting, detention, legal representation, court appearance, and public
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37 safety/court appearance. For each dependent variable, we implement a regression discontinuity
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39 model to assess whether there is a discontinuity at the time of SBO implementation.
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43 Two items capture bond setting at initial screening. *Release Without Money Bond at*
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45 *Initial Bond Screening* is a binary measure capturing if the judicial commissioner set a non-
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47 monetary bond, with or without conditions (1=true, 0=false). *Bond Amount Set by Judicial*
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49 *Commissioner* is the natural logarithm of initial bond amount⁸ set by judicial commissioner (in
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51 thousands of dollars, plus one dollar).
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55 Four items capture the impact of bail review on bond setting. *Release Without Money*
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57 *Bond within Seven Days* reflects if a defendant was released⁹ on a non-monetary bond within
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seven days of initial bond setting (1=true, 0=false). *Bond Amount Set by Any Judicial Official* uses the initial judicial commissioner amount unless a new bond amount was set within seven days of initial bond setting (natural logarithm, in thousands of dollars, plus one dollar).¹⁰ *Reduction in Bond Amount* captures if the initial bond amount was reduced within seven days of initial bond setting (1=true, 0=false). *Increase in Bond Amount* reflects if the initial bond amount was increased within seven days of initial bond setting (1=true, 0=false).

Two binary measures capture additional court processes. *Custody less than 7 Days* refers to individuals being released within 168 hours (1=true, 0=false). *Timely Counsel* is the documented assignment of counsel within two business days¹¹ of the initial bond setting (1=true, 0=false).

The final three binary dependent variables are related to public safety and court appearances. *Failure to Appear* captures if a defendant was issued a bench warrant and/or a conditional bond forfeiture order on the General Sessions case, or related case in Criminal Court, within a reference period (120, 300, and 500 days of initial bond setting), calculated only for defendants released pretrial¹² within the reference period (1=true, 0=false). *Pretrial Rearrest* is when a defendant was arrested on a General Sessions Case filed after release from jail and prior to the disposition of the present case in both General Sessions and Criminal Court within a reference period (120, 300, and 500 days of initial bond setting), calculated only for defendants released pretrial within the reference period (1=true, 0=false). *Recidivism* is when a defendant was arrested on a General Sessions Case filed after release from jail in both General Sessions and Criminal Court within a reference period (120, 300, and 500 days of initial bond setting). This was calculated for all defendants including those never released. (1=true, 0=false)

Control Variables

Several control variables capture various court processes. The hour/minute of the initial bond setting are sine-transformed (*sin_time*)¹³ and cosine-transformed (*cos_time*). The number of previous Shelby County jail bookings on other cases in the last four years is measured by taking the natural logarithm plus one (*log_prev_jail_bookings_4yr*). Offense severity reflects the most severe charged offense at the initial bond setting, specified as a continuous variable (*offense_severity*) (0-1),¹⁴ as well as quadratic (*offense_severity_sq*) and cubic transformations (*offense_severity_cu*). Two additional variables capture different types of offenses. Violent crime (*violent_initial*) refers to when a defendant is charged at time of initial bond setting with a crime of violence¹⁵ (1=true, 0=false). Narcotics offense (*narcotic_initial*) refers to when a defendant is charged at time of initial bond setting with a narcotics-related offense¹⁶ (1=true, 0=false).

Finally, fixed effects were included for each of 13 judicial commissioners assigning initial bond amount (*commissionerA*, *commissionerB*, ..., *commissionerM*). The reference category is unknown commissioner. Fixed effects were also included for each General Sessions court division (*courtdivision7*, *courtdivision8*, ..., *courtdivision15*). We only include divisions 7-13 and 15, which are the primary divisions adjudicating criminal cases.¹⁷ The reference category is unknown/miscellaneous division. Finally, fixed effects were included for day of the week, ordered sequentially with *dayofweek1*=Thursday (*dayofweek1*, ..., *dayofweek6*). Wednesday is the reference category.

Three binary demographic variables are included. Race (*white_nh*) refers to those who are non-Hispanic white (=1) relative to other races (=0). Ethnicity (*hispanic*) refers to those who indicated they are Hispanic (=1) relative to non-Hispanic (=0). Biological sex (*sex_female*) captures those who identify as female (=1) relative to other sexes (=0). Additionally, the natural logarithm of age is included (*log_age*).

Analytic Strategy

We utilize a sharp regression discontinuity specification with a linear, parametric functional form. We include parameters for the forcing variable (*days*) and the discontinuity (*days* > 0). To allow different slopes on both sides of the cutoff, we also include the interaction between these two terms. We also include an intercept and the listed control variables. We use linear regression for regressions on logged bond amounts which are continuous measures; as all other dependent variables are dichotomous, we use logistic regression in line with best practices (Berk, 2009). We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). We use a uniform kernel with a bandwidth of 120 days before and after the implementation date.

For each control variable, we evaluate the balance of the distribution of each variable before and after the implementation date with a series of regression analyses. For each variable, we evaluate whether a statistically significant discontinuity exists at the point of implementation by regressing the variable on the forcing variable (*days*), the discontinuity (*days* > 0), and their interaction. We use linear regression for continuous dependent variables and logistic regression for binary dependent variables. Like the primary specification, we utilize a 120-day bandwidth and uniform kernel.

In Table 1, we report the coefficients and p-value for the discontinuity term for each of the modeled regressions. We also provide visualizations of means of each covariate by day in Figure 2. We identify statistically significant differences in *narcotic_initial*, *log_age*, and *sin_time*, suggesting that there exist some meaningful differences in the types of cases before and after the distribution. We are unaware of any systematic causes for these differences, but it seems very unlikely that these factors are related to bail reform such as manipulation of charging behavior. We also find statistically significant discontinuities for several factors that are likely

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4 manifestations of the forcing variable, such as day of the week and the scheduling of judicial
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6 commissioners or assignment of cases into court divisions.¹⁸ Because of the discontinuities
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8 identified, we find the inclusion of control variables to be important to minimize confounding.
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12 [insert Figure 2 about here]
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15 [insert Table 1 about here]
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17 To further guard against the possibility of manipulation of the forcing variable, we
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19 visualize the temporal distribution of cases by day in Figure 3. Examining across the 7,772 cases
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21 falling within a 120-day bandwidth, we find no visual evidence of discontinuity in cases around
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23 the cutoff date. We further evaluate this using McCrary’s test (McCrary, 2008)¹⁹ to test for
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25 manipulation of the forcing variable. Using a bin width of 5 days²⁰ and a 120-day bandwidth, the
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27 test did not find any evidence of a discontinuity in case counts ($p=.2747$). We also utilized an
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29 alternative bin width of 1 day and found a similar result ($p=.3027$).
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34 [insert Figure 3 about here]
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37 RESULTS

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39 We report results for each set of dependent variables in turn.²¹
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42 *Initial Bail Setting Determinations by Judicial Commissioners.* We first examine the
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44 impacts of the SBO on bond decisions made at initial screening by judicial commissioners. On
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46 the date of implementation, judicial commissioners were required to utilize new bail screening
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48 forms that situated release on recognizance as the default, with formal judicial determinations
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50 required in order to impose further conditions, an affordable monetary bond, or an unaffordable
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52 money bond. The results of our analysis are shown in Figure 4/Table 2. We do not find evidence
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54 of any statistically significant impacts of the full implementation of the SBO – that is to say,
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4 bond amounts and recognizance rates do not appear to change immediately on the morning of
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7 February 15, 2023.

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9 [insert Figure 4 about here]

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11 [insert Table 2 about here]

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14 While the SBO processes, forms, and legal obligations were neither implemented nor
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16 until the date of implementation, we note that judicial commissioners have received training on
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18 the SBO prior to the implementation date. As a part of this rollout, assessment of bail
19
20 affordability using the Vera Institute Ability to Pay Calculator began on December 24, 2022. In
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22 e-mail correspondence with the author, one county official described this as “an experimentation
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24 stage” so judicial commissioners could “get used to” the new information.
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28 We conduct a set of additional regression discontinuity analyses using a cutoff date of
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30 December 24, 2022, to assess the informational impacts of providing judicial commissioners
31
32 with information on bail affordability. These analyses are identically specified to the primary
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34 models on the dependent variables of initial bond amount, initial release without monetary bond,
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36 and time in custody. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5/Table 3 and identify
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38 statistically significant impacts on all three variables. According to the regression results, holding
39
40 all else fixed, defendants were 36% more likely to be released without the requirement of a
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42 money bond and 28% more likely to be released from custody within the first seven days of the
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44 case. Overall bond amounts decreased 32%.
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51 [insert Figure 5 about here]

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53 [insert Table 3 about here]

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55 *Bail Outcomes within 7 Days.* The SBO added an additional bail review process for
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57 defendants still held in custody following the judicial commissioner’s initial bail determination.
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4 The bail review process provides an additional layer of judicial review to the initial screening;
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6 while defendants have always been able to make a motion to reconsider their bond amount, the
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8 bail review process made it a requirement to conduct a *de novo* review of the bond amount set
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10 with both the state and defendant represented by counsel. To operationalize bail review and
11
12 understand the full impacts of the SBO on bail setting in general, we examine bail levels set
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14 during a seven-day period following initial bond setting.
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19 The results of our analyses are shown in Figure 6/Table 4. First, we find that, following
20
21 full implementation of the SBO, defendants were 35% more likely to be released on a
22
23 recognizance bond within seven days. We also find an 11% reduction in bond amounts required.
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25 We note that judicial review operates as a force that can both decrease and increase pretrial
26
27 detention requirements: our regressions find that bail review made defendants 165% more likely
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29 to receive a bond reduction within seven days, but also increased the (previously near-zero)
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31 probability of receiving a bond increase by 722%. Both before and after implementation,
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33 however, the absolute probability of a bond reduction was much higher than a bond increase, as
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35 shown in Figure 6.
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41 [insert Figure 6 about here]
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43 [insert Table 4 about here]
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46 *Process Outcomes.* In Figure 7/Table 5, we examine the impacts of the SBO on process
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48 outcomes. First, we consider timely access to counsel. Because the SBO requires that defendants
49
50 held in custody receive a hearing with access to legal counsel, we examined the share of cases in
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52 which defendants had been assigned counsel within two business days following initial bond
53
54 setting. Our analysis finds a significant discontinuity at the time of implementation, with
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56 defendants 138% more likely to receive timely counsel.
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[insert Figure 7 about here]

[insert Table 5 about here]

We also consider whether the SBO reduced the share of defendants who were released within seven days. We find that defendants were 69% more likely to be released within the first seven days of a case following full SBO implementation. We conduct a similar analysis (Figure 5/Table 3) for the Vera calculator deployment on December 22, 2022, and find a statistically significant impact at that date as well, with defendants being 28% more likely to be released within the first seven days.

Public Safety/Court Non-Appearance. We examine the effects of the SBO on court non-appearance (bench warrant/bond conditional forfeiture), pretrial rearrest (arrest on a new case prior to disposition of the existing case), and recidivism (arrest for any reason on a new case). We consider impacts over 120-day, 300-day, and 500-day periods. We report the results in Figures 8-10 and Tables 6-8. We do not identify any statistically significant impacts of the SBO on any public safety variable. We reproduce the analysis for the December 22, 2022 date and furthermore find no statistically significant impact on any public safety variable.

[insert Figures 8-10 about here]

[insert Tables 6-8 about here]

Robustness Checks. To validate the robustness of the results, we rerun the analyses using bandwidths of 90 days and 60 days. The results are reported in Table 9. The robustness checks confirm that initial bond amounts set by judicial commissioners did not decrease, or ROR rates increase, following full SBO implementation; in fact, some models found the opposite.

[insert Table 9 about here]

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4 When examining impacts of bond setting at seven days, several models with smaller
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6 bandwidths do not detect statistically significant effects. For example, when examining the rate
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8 of cases with a release on recognizance bond within seven days, a statistically significant impact
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10 is not found, despite the apparent visual discontinuity identified in Figure 6.
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14 Of the 54 robustness check models assessing measures of public safety and court non-
15
16 appearance, we find only three that suggest a statistically significant discontinuity: one
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18 suggesting an increase and two suggesting a decrease. As a whole, the robustness checks do not
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20 appear to alter our conclusion that the SBO did not have a meaningfully identifiable impact on
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22 public safety.
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25 26 **DISCUSSION**

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28 In response to ongoing concerns about the traditional bail and bond system, Shelby
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30 County, Tennessee, implemented a Standing Bail Order (SBO) that emphasizes consideration of
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32 a defendant's ability to pay, presumption of release, and access to legal counsel during bail
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34 review hearings. This reform, which took effect in February 2023, provides a unique opportunity
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36 to examine its effects. Treating the timing of this policy change as a natural experiment, this
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38 study uses a regression discontinuity design to assess the causal impact of the SBO on a range of
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40 pretrial outcomes.
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46 Our analysis indicates that the SBO appears to have had a meaningful impact on reducing
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48 pretrial conditions without statistically identifiable impacts on court appearance on public safety.
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50 We found the reductions in bond amounts came in two phases. First, as judicial commissioners
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52 began to review information on defendants' bond affordability in a pilot phase of the SBO
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54 implementation in December 2022, judicial commissioners reduced bond amounts and increased
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56 utilization of recognizance bonds. Second, the bail review process implemented in February
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4 2023 provided additional judicial review of bond levels for defendants remaining in custody. As
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6 a whole, the bail review process reduced bond requirements and increased the number of
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8 defendants released within seven days. Incidentally, we also saw increased rates of the timeliness
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10 with which defendants obtained legal counsel due to the need for detained defendants to be
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12 legally represented during the bail review hearing. With these significant changes to the pretrial
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14 process, we did not find statistically significant effects on court non-appearance, pretrial rearrest,
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16 or recidivism overall.
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21 Our findings are consistent with broader reform efforts across jurisdictions that aim to
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23 decouple pretrial release decisions from a defendant's ability to pay while demonstrating the
24
25 critical role of procedural enhancements such as timely access to legal counsel and mandatory
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27 bail review hearings. The provision of early counsel is widely considered essential to protect due
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29 process and mitigate unnecessary incarceration (Heaton, 2021; Colbert et al., 2001; Colbert,
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31 2020). The SBO thus validates the call by legal scholars and advocates to counsel at first
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33 appearance as a standard pretrial practice.
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38 This study also addresses a concern often associated with bail reform, where there will be
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40 unintended consequences of threats to public safety. We found no evidence of increases in
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42 failure to appear, pretrial arrest, or recidivism following the implementation of SBO. This is
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44 consistent with prior studies that found reduced reliance on cash bail does not result in higher
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46 rates of violent crime or new arrest (Brooker et al., 2014; Jorgensen & Smith, 2021; Stemen &
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48 Olson, 2020). These findings challenge larger assumptions that financial stakes are necessary to
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50 ensure court appearances or, more broadly, deter crime. Although more research is needed to
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52 confirm these findings, they suggest structured judicial review and procedural fairness can
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54 achieve similar, if not superior, outcomes without the collateral harms of pretrial incarceration.
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4 One nuanced finding of this study is that initial bond-setting practices by judicial
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6 commissioners began to shift following the December 2022 introduction of affordability
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8 information. This indicates that informal practices and institutional learning may precede formal
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10 reform. This supports prior work documenting the importance of implementation climate and
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12 practitioner buy-in (Jorgensen & Smith, 2021). In Shelby County, pre-implementation exposure
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14 to the Vera Institute's Ability to Pay Calculator may have primed judicial commissioners to
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16 internalize new expectations before formal mandates took effect. Such findings underscore the
17
18 importance of rollout strategies and training in shaping judicial behavior in the context of reform.
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24 In 2024, a new state law prohibited the consideration of a defendant's ability to pay as a
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26 factor in bail determinations. As a result, data from the Vera Institute's calculator and the
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28 concept of bond affordability are no longer part of the bail decision-making process. However,
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30 the procedural reforms introduced through the SBO remain in effect, including mandatory bail
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32 review hearings and the requirement that judicial commissioners formally justify the imposition
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34 of any financial bond.
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39 Overall, this study contributes valuable evidence to the ongoing policy debate around bail
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41 reform, reinforcing that well-designed interventions can reduce reliance on wealth-based
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43 detention while preserving public safety and court efficiency. Its findings echo those from
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45 jurisdictions with more sweeping bail eliminations as well as those with more modest procedural
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47 changes. The Shelby County SBO represents a middle-ground reform that preserved judicial
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49 discretion while embedding fairness-oriented safeguards—particularly the introduction of
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51 affordability assessments and defense counsel access. As jurisdictions nationwide continue to
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53 grapple with pretrial justice challenges, these findings suggest that targeted reforms emphasizing
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4 transparency, review, and legal representation can yield meaningful improvements without
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6 compromising safety.
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9 **Limitations**

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11 Despite these promising findings, several limitations should be acknowledged. First,
12 while the regression discontinuity design offers strong internal validity, the use of time as the
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14 forcing variable means the study is inherently sensitive to any temporal confounders that might
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16 coincide with the policy change. Although we conducted balance checks and robustness analyses
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18 that did not suggest major threats to validity, we did observe discontinuities in a few control
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20 variables such as age and narcotics charges, which could indicate minor sample imbalances.
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25 Second, like for any case study, generalizability may be limited. Shelby County's legal
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27 infrastructure, administrative reforms, and political environment may not reflect other
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29 jurisdictions, especially those with different levels of pretrial detention or court resources. It is
30
31 essential that these findings be replicated in other jurisdictions. Moreover, given the data only
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33 focus on this one county, we are limited in our investigation into criminal histories within other
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35 jurisdictions. It is possible that individuals were rearrested in other locations or their rearrest took
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37 place within a neighboring suburban municipal court.
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43 Third, while we used rearrest and recidivism as proxies for crime, these may not fully
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45 capture the nuanced community impacts of pretrial release. Moreover, rearrest data depend on
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47 enforcement patterns that could themselves be shaped by local policy or policing behavior. These
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49 measures reflect responses to crime and not actual self-reported crimes. Additionally, some of
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51 the post-SBO changes in judicial behavior may reflect short-term adaptation or learning effects;
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53 longer-term follow-up will be necessary to assess the durability of these trends.
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4 Fourth, a significant fraction of cases in Shelby County are eligible for expungement (i.e.,
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6 the destruction of a defendant's court records) if the case is dismissed or not prosecuted (nolle
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8 prosequi). Cases may also be expunged if the disposition is diversion and a fee paid.²² When
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10 expunged, their full case records are deleted, dropping them from statistical analyses that are
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12 subsequently conducted. When comparing outcomes over time, estimates may be biased because
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14 later time periods include a large number of cases that will be expunged, while earlier time
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16 periods have fewer such cases as expungement has already taken place. Because expunged cases
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18 are systematically different than non-expunged cases, and due to the large number of
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20 expungements, this constitutes a significant limitation to the analysis, particularly when
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22 examining cases across time or from more recent time periods. For example, rearrest statistics
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24 calculated on later time periods will likely include rearrests on cases that will later be expunged,
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26 while rearrest statistics calculated on earlier time periods will not.
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33 A final limitation of our study is one that is common for projects that leverage large-scale
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35 administrative data. We merged elements from different court system modules and other
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37 databases. As a result, measurement error can occur due to historical changes in data entry
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39 procedures over time, data entry error, incomplete documentation, or in the technical manner in
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41 which data is housed. For example, bond postings, bail hearings, and affordable bail calculator
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43 amounts are housed somewhat separately; while the data can be linked through case number, this
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45 can be challenging when handling cases of multiple events for the same case, or in handling
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47 outliers with respect to the timing of events to each other. There also exists the possibility of
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49 measurement error due to the unavoidable complexity of the criminal justice system itself: cases
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51 can be complex and require multiple hearings, and charges can be dropped or added throughout a
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53 case.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, this study contributes to the growing body of evidence suggesting that jurisdictions can improve pretrial equity without compromising safety. The SBO appears to have meaningfully shifted the pretrial landscape in Shelby County by reducing unnecessary detention and increasing access to legal counsel, all without increasing crime or missed court dates. Future research should continue to evaluate the long-term effects of such reforms and explore how similar strategies might be adapted to diverse legal and political contexts.

NOTES

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¹Exceptions to this process include cases where a court has pre-set the bond level (such as a bench warrant on an existing case or a referral from a suburban municipal court), if the defendant is arrested related to a case bound over to Criminal Court, or if the defendant is held on a courtesy hold.

² Tennessee Code Annotated 40-11-115 to 40-11-117.

³ Officials may also hold without bond, but only for capital offenses (Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 15).

⁴ The SBO technically requires the bail hearing for those with unaffordable bonds, however, in practice, it was implemented for every defendant.

⁵ While the order specifies a hearing within 72 hours, in practice this is a requirement of two business days as one business day is required for arraignment and assignment of counsel. Defendants arrested late Friday or early weekend often do not receive their hearing within 72 hours.

⁶ The sole exception to this timing is the administration of the Affordable Bail Calculator itself. This information was provided to judicial commissioners beginning on December 24, 2022, in what one county official described as “an experimentation stage” so judicial commissioners could “get used to” the new information.

⁷ Formally, we define the forcing variable as equal to 0.5 plus the integer number of 24-hour periods between the initial bail setting and the moment of implementation (February 15, 2023, 8:00am). For example, the forcing variable equals 0.5 for any initial bail setting between February 15, 2023, 8:00am and February 16, 2023, 7:59am. Likewise, the forcing variable equals 1.5 for those occurring in the subsequent 24-hour period, -0.5 for the 24-hour period prior to implementation, and so forth. Cases with a forcing variable value exceeding zero occur after SBO implementation, while cases with a value below zero occur prior to SBO implementation. The two closest cases to the cutoff time are a case involving a 2:16am bond setting, which is not subject to SBO procedures, and a case at 8:32am which is. We set the cutoff at 8:00am because of the likely shift change at that hour.

⁸ This is \$0 for a non-monetary bond. We drop cases in a small number of capital cases where the defendant is held without bond (infinite bond).

⁹ We use bond posted data for this outcome, not bond setting data. There are rare cases where a defendant has a non-monetary bond setting but a corresponding release-on-recognizance bond is not posted.

¹⁰ For bond amount and the direction of change, if there are multiple changes within seven days, we use the first change.

¹¹ To calculate business days, we review hearings data from General Sessions Court to which days General Sessions Court is open. This accounts for the lack of review hearings on weekends,

inclement weather days, etc. If the initial bond setting occurs before 10:00am, we count the current day when counting days; otherwise, we do not include the current day.

¹² Release pretrial is defined as a recorded, substantive charge disposition for all charges for all associated cases. Diversion on a charge would count as a charge disposition. We do not count items classified in the court management system as “charges” which appear associated with post-conviction actions (such as petition to revoke a suspended sentence).

¹³ The hour and minute are expressed as a decimal value (for example, 1:30pm = 13.5), then normalized by multiplying by $2\pi/24$. The sine (cosine) of this value is then taken to complete the sine (cosine) transformation. This transformation addresses the circularity of time, for example ensuring that 11:59pm and 12:00am are treated as nearly identical.

¹⁴ Class C Misdemeanor = 0, Class B Misdemeanor = 0.125, Class A Misdemeanor = 0.25, Class E Felony = 0.375, Class D Felony = 0.5, Class C Felony = 0.625, Class B Felony = 0.75, Class A Felony = 0.875, Capital Murder = 1

¹⁵ We define crime of violence as any offense in the Tennessee Code Annotated title 39, chapter 13, sections 101 to 509. We also include section 522, 527-529, 531-532, 534-535, and 801-812.

¹⁶ We define narcotics-related offenses as any offense in the Tennessee Code Annotated title 39, chapter 17, part 4.

¹⁷ Division 14 is environmental court. Division 1-6 constitutes the civil division of General Sessions Court.

¹⁸ The discontinuity for court division 8, which is drug court, is likely associated with the reduction in narcotic charges after the cutoff as identified in *narcotic_initial*.

¹⁹ Implemented using the DCdensity function in R's rdd package. We use a bandwidth of 120 days.

²⁰ Due to the nature of our dependent variable, we round the default bandwidth of 4.813 to 5.

²¹ Tables report raw coefficients and robust standard errors. For logistic regression results, coefficients are exponentiated into odds ratios throughout this narrative (for example: 35% more likely = odds ratio 1.35).

²² Although less applicable in this case, state law also allows for certain nonviolent offenders meeting specific eligibility criteria to expunge their records after five years.

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Figure 1: Flowchart




Figure 2: Covariate Balance Visualization (means binned per day)




Figure 3: Smoothness of Forcing Variable




Figure 4: Impacts of SBO on Bail Amounts Set at Initial Screening




Figure 5: Impacts of Calculator Introduction (December 22, 2022) of Bail Amounts & Custody




Figure 6: Impacts on Bail Setting at Day 7




Figure 7: Impacts on Process Outcomes




Figure 8: Impacts on Court Non-Appearance




Figure 9: Impacts on Pretrial Rearrest




Figure 10: Impacts on Recidivism









Table 1: Covariate Balance Regressions

Variable	Regression	Estimate	P Value
white_nh	Logistic	0.9944	0.7166
hispanic	Logistic	1.0108	0.2564
sex_female	Linear	-0.0312	0.0955
log_age	Linear	0.0336	0.0360 *
sin_time	Linear	-0.0737	0.0241 *
cos_time	Linear	-0.0499	0.1360
log_prev_jail_bookings	Linear	0.0322	0.3282
offense_severity	Linear	-0.0108	0.2723
offense_severity_sq	Linear	-0.0055	0.5470
offense_severity_cu	Linear	-0.0018	0.8177
commissionerA	Logistic	1.0903	0.0000 *
commissionerB	Logistic	1.0812	0.0000 *
commissionerC	Logistic	0.9476	0.0000 *
commissionerD	Logistic	1.0276	0.0101 *
commissionerE	Logistic	1.0135	0.3777
commissionerF	Logistic	0.9752	0.0373 *
commissionerG	Logistic	0.9840	0.1014
commissionerH	Logistic	1.0600	0.0001 *
commissionerI	Logistic	0.9224	0.0000 *
commissionerJ	Logistic	0.8512	0.0000 *
commissionerK	Logistic	1.0100	0.4041
commissionerL	Logistic	1.0503	0.0003 *
commissionerM	Logistic	1.0157	0.1652
court_div7	Logistic	1.0208	0.1814
court_div8	Logistic	0.9507	0.0018 *
court_div9	Logistic	0.9755	0.1106
court_div10	Logistic	0.9792	0.2534
court_div11	Logistic	1.0112	0.4710
court_div12	Logistic	1.0343	0.0267 *
court_div13	Logistic	1.0222	0.1105
court_div15	Logistic	1.0066	0.6556
violent_initial	Logistic	1.0099	0.6641
narcotic_initial	Logistic	0.9516	0.0048 *
dayofweek1	Logistic	1.0258	0.1345
dayofweek2	Logistic	0.9622	0.0136 *
dayofweek3	Logistic	0.9405	0.0000 *
dayofweek4	Logistic	0.9386	0.0001 *
dayofweek5	Logistic	1.0578	0.0013 *
dayofweek6	Logistic	1.0311	0.0857

Table 2: Impacts of SBO on Bail Amounts Set at Initial Screening

	ROR at Initial Screening	Bond Amount Set at Initial Screening, logged
Discontinuity	-0.020 0.130	0.082 0.053
Days	-0.000 0.001	-0.001** 0.001
Interaction	-0.002 0.002	0.005*** 0.001
Num.Obs.	7772	7740
R2		0.485
R2 Adj.		0.482
AIC	6791.0	23205.3
BIC	7090.2	23511.3
Log.Lik.	-3352.507	-11558.653
F	27.977	188.035
RMSE	0.37	1.08

Table 3: Impacts of Calculator Introduction (December 22, 2022) of Bail Amounts & Custody

	Initial ROR	Initial Bond Amount, logged	Custody <7 days
Discontinuity	0.304* (0.126)	-0.323*** (0.049)	0.244* (0.115)
Days	-0.003* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Interaction	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Num.Obs.	7917	7880	7765
R2		0.480	
R2 Adj.		0.477	
AIC	7017.3	23381.6	8086.8
BIC	7317.3	23688.4	8385.9
Log.Lik.	-3465.661	-11646.822	-4000.384
F	28.042	178.551	47.366
RMSE	0.38	1.06	0.41

Table 4: Impacts on Bail Setting at Day 7

	ROR at Day 7	Bond Amount at Day 7	Bond Reduced in 7 Days	Bond Increased in 7 Days
Discontinuity	0.297* 0.119	-0.106* 0.054	0.974*** 0.168	2.107*** 0.511
Days	-0.000 0.001	-0.001** 0.001	0.002 0.002	-0.005 0.007
Interaction	-0.003 0.002	0.005*** 0.001	-0.005 0.002	0.007 0.007
Num.Obs.	7772	7746	7772	7772
R2		0.444		
R2 Adj.		0.440		
AIC	8115.4	23433.8	5120.1	1677.6
BIC	8414.6	23739.8	5419.4	1976.8
Log.Lik.	-4014.701	-11672.886	-2517.075	-795.792
F	26.993	140.925	14.558	47.575
RMSE	0.41	1.09	0.31	0.16

Table 5: Impacts on Process Outcomes

	Timely Counsel	Custody <7 Days
Discontinuity	0.867***	0.524***
	0.107	0.123
Days	0.003*	-0.001
	0.001	0.001
Interaction	-0.007***	-0.006***
	0.002	0.002
Num.Obs.	7772	7595
AIC	9546.0	7837.2
BIC	9845.2	8135.4
Log.Lik.	-4729.994	-3875.579
F	33.175	33.473
RMSE	0.46	0.41

Table 6: Impacts on Court Non-Appearance

	Bench Warrant (120 days)	Bench Warrant (300 days)	Bench Warrant (500 days)
Discontinuity	0.143	0.185	0.207
	0.201	0.176	0.171
Days	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	0.002	0.002	0.002
Interaction	0.004	0.001	0.003
	0.003	0.003	0.002
Num.Obs.	5749	5830	5854
AIC	3431.1	4259.7	4584.0
BIC	3717.3	4546.6	4871.0
Log.Lik.	-1672.547	-2086.855	-2248.990
F	16.689	15.238	15.088
RMSE	0.29	0.33	0.34

Table 7: Impacts on Pretrial Rearrest

	Pretrial Rearrest (120 days)	Pretrial Rearrest (300 days)	Pretrial Rearrest (500 days)
Discontinuity	0.164	0.138	0.187
	0.199	0.162	0.153
Days	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	0.002	0.002	0.002
Interaction	0.004	0.003	0.003
	0.003	0.002	0.002
Num.Obs.	5749	5830	5854
AIC	3665.1	4917.0	5380.7
BIC	3951.3	5203.9	5667.8
Log.Lik.	-1789.548	-2415.522	-2647.375
F	41.225	17.321	18.487
RMSE	0.30	0.36	0.38

Table 8: Impacts on Recidivism

	Recidivism (120 days)	Recidivism (300 days)	Recidivism (500 days)
Discontinuity	0.261	-0.005	0.087
	0.158	0.123	0.113
Days	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002
	0.002	0.001	0.001
Interaction	0.002	0.002	0.003*
	0.002	0.002	0.002
Num.Obs.	7288	7560	7695
AIC	5344.5	7822.1	8926.4
BIC	5641.0	8120.1	9225.2
Log.Lik.	-2629.270	-3868.059	-4420.210
F	20.597	28.765	30.632
RMSE	0.33	0.41	0.44

Table 9: Bandwidth Robustness Checks

			Bandwidth		
			120 (primary model)	90	60
Full Implementation	Initial Screening	Release without monetary bond			-
		Bond amount set		+	
	After 7 Days	Release on recognizance	+		
		Bond amount set	-		
		Bond amount reduced	+	+	+
		Bond amount increased	+	+	
	Process Outcomes	Timely counsel	+	+	+
		Custody <7 Days	+	+	+
	Public Safety	Bench warrant, 120 days			
		Bench warrant, 300 days			
		Bench warrant, 500 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 120 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 300 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 500 days		+	
		Recidivism, 120 days			
		Recidivism, 300 days			-
		Recidivism, 500 days			
Calculator Deployment	Initial Screening	Release without monetary bond	+	+	+
		Bond amount sent	-	-	-
	Process Outcomes	Custody <7 days	+		+
	Public Safety	Bench warrant, 120 days			
		Bench warrant, 300 days			
		Bench warrant, 500 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 120 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 300 days			
		Pretrial rearrest, 500 days		-	
		Recidivism, 120 days			
		Recidivism, 300 days			
		Recidivism, 500 days			

+ = Statistically significant positive discontinuity

- = Statistically significant negative discontinuity

Blank = No statistically significant discontinuity

Gray boxes indicate a divergence from the primary model